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JUSTICE BRENNAN'S GENDER JURISPRUDENCE
by
REBECCA KORZEC·

INTRODUCTION

During his thirty-four year tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice William
Joseph Brennan, Jr. demonstrated unparalleled sensitivity to the protection of
individual rights. l Justice Brennan's landmark opinions included Baker v. Carr,2
Goldberg v. Kelly,3 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.4 Before Brennan,
Supreme Court jurisprudence exalted judicial passivity by employing techniques
for avoiding constitutional issues, such as abstention, comity, exhaustion of
remedies and the political question doctrine.!i
Against this background, Brennan became an active judicial voice in a
series of innovative landmark cases, including decisions requiring federal officials
to pay damages for violation of citizens' constitutional rights;6 authorizing federal
courts to issue injunctions forbidding state court prosecutions under laws violating
the First Amendment; 7 and pennitting congressional employees to sue members
of Congress for discriminatory treatment. 8
However, less attention has been focused on Justice Brennan's dramatic
impact on the Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence. More than any other
member of the Court, Justice Brennan recognized the complexity and pervasiveness of sex discrimination and its costs to society as a whole. 9 Brennan's

• Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
See, e.g., TOlenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REv. 33 (1990).

1

2369 U.S. 186 (1962) (apportionment decisions are not purely political and therefore justiciable).
3397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare as a property right proleCted by the due process clause).
4376 U.S. 254 (1964) (established actual malice standatd in defamation actions involving public figures).
, See, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term - Foreword, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv.
40 (1961).
6

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

7

Dombrowski v. Pfisler, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

a Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).

Nothing in Justice Brennan's background foreshadowed his commitment to equality between the sexes.
Justice Brennan was born in 1906 in Newark, New Jersey, the second of eight children of Irish-Catholic
immigrant parents. After atlending parochial and public schools in Newark, Brennan gradualed from the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and from Harvard Law School in 1931. Brennan
practiced labor law before becoming a New Jersey trial judge. In 1952, he was appointed to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. In 1956. President Eisenhower nominaled Brennan to replace Associale Justice
Sherman Minton. McQuade & Kardos, Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy, 33 NOTRE DAME
9
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opinions recognized that sex differentiation is largely cultural in origin, rather
than based on "real" gender differences. 1o As a result, Justice Brennan created
a truly independent gender jurisprudence, eventually emerging as the architect of
the Supreme Court's contemporary test for evaluating claims of sex-based
discrimination.
Understanding the significance of Brennan's contribution requires an
appreciation of the Supreme Court's historical attitude towards sex-based
discrimination. Before 1971, the Supreme Court unifonnly upheld governmental
classifications based on stereotypical and traditional role differences between men
and women. Laws routinely classified individuals by gender, treating men and
women as occupying separate spheres. Men occupied the sphere of wage-eamer,
family head and societal actor. Women were assigned the roles of childbearer
and rearer, and homemaker. These roles were thought to be mandated by nature
and biology. Since men and women perfonned different roles, they could not
stand as equals under the law. 11
Gender In Traditional Case Law
Bradwell v. lllinois12 was the first case to raise a constitutional challenge
to the different treatment of men and women. In that case, Myra Bradwell
challenged the refusal of the State of lliinois to pennit her to practice law solely
because she was a woman. 13 The United States Supreme Court held that the
lliinois standard did not offend the Privileges and Immunities Cause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 14 As described by Justice Bradley, "Man is, or should

L. REv. 321 (1958); cf., Vanderbilt, New Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 43 A.B.A.I.
526 (1957):
For Mr. Justice Brennan the law is a living reality concerned with human beings,
rather than a series of judicial declarations embalmed in judicial opinions. His enthusiasm is contagious and his ability to deal with judges and lawyers is outstanding. While
he is keenly conscious of the fact that we live in a constantly changing world, he is
equally aware of the fact that human nature changes very little. He is, therefore,
instinctively inclined to preserve the essentials of all that is good in the past and to adapt
them to the needs of the times.
10

See, e.g., D. Rhode, Gender and Justice 63-80 (1990).

See, e.g., Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, 47 N.Y.U. L REv. 1033, 1044-70
(1972). See Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaulls on Feminist Community,
Illinois 1869-1895, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1518, 1523-29 (1986) (Bradwell's case as an example of false
paternalism). See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), in which the Supreme Court refused to
issue a writ of mandamus requiring Virginia to admit to practice a woman who had already been admitted
to the bars of the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia. The Virginia statute provided that any
"person" admitted in any state or the District of Columbia could also be admitted in Virginia. "Person"
was interpreted to mean "male. "
11

1: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

l' Id. at 131.
14

Id. at 139.
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be, woman's protector and defender.... The paramount destiny and mission of
women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the

law of the Creator."lS
In Muller v. Oregon,16 the Court continued its deference to sex-based
classifications. There, the statute at issue prohibited employing women in
factories or laundries for more than ten hours per day.17 Three years earlier, in
Lochner v. New York,IS the Court had invalidated a state "maximum hours" law
for bakers, concluding that such a law was not a legitimate exercise of police
power because it unnecessarily interfered with individual freedom of contract 19
Nevertheless. the hours limitation for women in Muller was found valid on
familiar paternalistic grounds:

That woman's physical structure and the perfonnance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. . .. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex,
she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed
for her protection may be sustained. even when like legislation is not
necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to
close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and
depends upon him.20
The Court continued to "protect" women from earning a livelihood on the
same basis as men in Goesart v. Cleary.21 There, the Court upheld a Michigan
statute prohibiting the licensing of women as bartenders unless the woman was
the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed bar or tavem.22 The Court
did not even question the proposition that MiChigan could prohibit all women
from worldng as bartenders. Rather, the Court focused its attention on whether
Michigan could create an exception for the daughters and wives of male
owners.23 In upholding the statute, the Court found a legitimate state interest in
combatting moral and social problems, concluding that "the oversight assured
through ownership of a bar by a bannaid's husband or father minimize hazards

[d. at 141. (Bradley. J., concmring). Justice Brennan employed this quote as an example of the law's
"paternalistic attitude" in Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
16 208 u.s. 412 (1908).
17 [d. at 416.

15

u.s. 45

18

198

19

[d. at 64-65.

(l~:'5).

20

208 U.S. at 420-21.

21

335 U.S. 464 (1948).

22

[d. at 467.

23

[d. at 466.
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that confront a bannaid without such protecting oversight. ,,24
Significantly, as late as 1961 the Warren Court approved sex-based
distinctions which focused on woman as "the center of home and family life. ,,2S
In Hoyt v. Florida,26 the Court unanimously upheld a state law which rendered
males eligible for jury duty unless they requested an exemption, but automatically
granted women an exemption unless they volunteered?7 In upholding the
validity of this female exemption, the Court emphasized the centrality of woman's
role as wife and mother "despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the
restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of
community life fonnerly considered to be reserved to men.... ,,28 Moreover,
administrative convenience pennitted a broad exemption for all women rather than
requiring a showing of actual family responsibility.29
Indeed, all sex-based discrimination cases decided before 1971 under the
equal protection clause, were analyzed under the standard which the Supreme
Court employs in reviewing purely economic classifications. Under this standard,
the "rational relationship" test, the Court displays extreme deference to legislative
judgments respecting sex roles and classifications. 30

']A

[d.

15

Hoyt v. Rorida, 368 U.S. 57,62 (1961).

26

368 U.S. 57 (1961).
27 [d. at 69.
28

29

[d. at 62.
[d.

30 See ELY, Democracy and Distrust (1980), drawing a connection between political powerlessness and
gender classification. See also, L. KANOWITZ, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969);
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law, 46 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 756 (1971). The landmarlc worle
on equal protection analysis, Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344 (1949) remains the conceptual starting point Tusmann and TenBroek have noted that

[here], then is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection
of equal laws." But laws may classify. And "the very idea of classification is that of
inequality." In tackling this paradox, the Court has neither abandoned the demand for
equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course. It has
resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification.
The essence of that doctrine can be stated with deceptive simplicity. The
constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are
similarly situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a
classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated.

Goesart v. Gleary, supra, note 21, illustrates the degree of judicial deference accorded sex-based
classifications before 1971. Justice Frankfurter noted:
"Since the line ... drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the
suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of
male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling." 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948).

Fall,l99l]

GENDER JURISPRUDENCE

319

Reed v. Reed 31

In 1971, the use of this traditional standard of review ended abruptly in the
Court's decision in Reed v. Reed.32 In Reed, the Court unanimously invalidated
an Idaho statutory scheme which established a method for the selection of
administrators of intestate estates, requiring "males...be preferred to females"
between persons "equally entitled" to administer the estate.33 This starutory
preference for men was considered mandatory, without regard to individual
qualifications to serve as administrator.34
The Reed Court ostensibly applied the traditional "rational relationship"
test, inquiring whether the sex-based classification of the Idaho statute advanced
a pennissible statutory objective.3s Admittedly, the legislative scheme promoted
the goal of administrative convenience, reducing the workload of probate courts
by eliminating some contests for executor. 36 The critical question, however, was
whether the mandatory preference for men advanced this legitimate state objective
in a manner which did not offend the Equal Protection Clause. 37
The Court reasoned that giving ". . . a mandatory preference to
members of either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth; and whatever may be said as to
the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice
in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of
sex. ,,38 (Emphasis added)
The Reed approach is a departure from the rational relationship test of
Goesart or Hoyt. The administrative convenience for the Idaho probate courts in
Reed was similar, if not greater, than that of the Florida scheme in Hoyt. Clearly,
eliminating women from the class of potential claimants could reduce the probate
caseload. However, achieving this legitimate administrative goal of reducing the

31

404

u.s. 71

(1971).

32Id. The Cowtrelied on F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vitginia. 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920). Reed, 404 U.S.
at 76. Royster held a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly cUcumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster, 253 U.S. at 415.
33 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
34 Id. at 77.
"Id. at 76.
36ld.

37Id.
38

Id. at 76-77.
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judicial caseload could not be accomplished by such impennissible, arbitrary
means. The Idaho statute would not result in the selection of the most competent
executors unless it were based on the assumption that women are inherently less
capable than men in administering estates. The Court conCluded that such an
assumption rendered the Idaho scheme arbitrary. For the first time, the Court
demonstrated "some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor.... ,,39 It
is against this historical background that Justice Brennan's significant contributions to the law of sex-based discrimination should be evaluated.
BRENNAN'S GENDER DECISIONS

Frontiero v. Richardson40 was first in the series of sex-based discrimination opinions by Justice Brennan. Frontiero involved a challenge to a federal
statute which provided that spouses of male members of the anned services were
automatically considered "dependents" for purposes of obtaining increased
allowances and benefits, while spouses of female members were required to
demonstrate dependency on their wives for over half of their support41 With
only one dissenter, the Court concluded that this sex-based difference violated the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment42

As author of the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that sex should
be deemed a suspect classification requiring the highest standard of judicial
review.43 In examining the history and effect of discrimination against women,
Justice Brennan found that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, and national origin are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. ,,44 In effect, Brennan created
an independent gender discrimination jurisprudence.
Next, Justice Brennan addressed the rationale of the Frontiero statutory
scheme. The government offered administrative convenience as the sole
justification for its discriminatory scheme: Congress might find it efficient to
create a conclusive presumption of female dependence,4s while requiring actual
proof of male dependence. However, when pressed, the government failed to
prove actual economic savings.46 Ultimately, Justice Brennan concluded that the

'9 Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer EqIUll Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 34 (1972).
40 411 U.S. 677 (1971).
Id. at 679.
4Z [d. at 691.
43 [d. at 688 .

4.

.. Id. at 687-88.
•, [d. at 689.
46

[d. at 686.
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goal of administrative convenience could not justify sex-based classifications,
which promoted "romantic paternalism" acting to "put women not on a pedestal,
but in a cage. ,,47
The significance of Justice Brennan's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to
have sex declared a suspect classification cannot be overestimated. The Supreme
Court treats governmental classifications based on race and national origin as
suspect. subjecting them to strict scrutiny. For the most part, strict scrutiny
invalidates classifications while rational relationship almost always upholds the
governmental scheme. Professor Gunther has noted that, as a practical matter,
this strict standard of judicial review is "fatal in fact" to a classification.48
Having failed to attract the necessary votes to declare sex a suspect
classification, Justice Brennan modified his position in Craig v. Boren.49 The
Craig Court invalidated Oldahoma statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to
males under 21 and females under 18.50 The state argued that statistical surveys
demonstrated a high correlation between sex and alcohol-related driving offenses
in that 2% of males but only 18% of females aged 18-20 had such driving

Id. at 684. Justice Brennan specifically asserted that what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect
categories as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perfonn or contribute to society. As a
result, statutoI)' distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire
class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
Id. at 686 .
47

.. Gunther, supra, note 39, at 8.
In his 1975 opinion for the Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Brennan
hinted that he would adopt a different approach to accommodate the reluctance of the other justices to
treat sex-based classifications as inherently suspect Wiesenfeld involved a provision of the Social
Security Act which provided survivors' benefits directly to widows having minor children in their care.
while widowers with minor children received benefits only for their children. The Court invalidated the
statute under FrOnliero. Id. at 642-43. Justice Brennan reasoned that both provisions assumed that the
earnings of male workers, but not those of females, were vital to the family unit Id. at 643. Brennan
viewed this legislative scheme as "denigrat[ing] ... the efforts of women who do work and whose
earnings contribute significantly to their families' support. ld. at 645. To gain a consensus, Justice
Brennan refrained from grounding his analysis on sex as a suspect classification, emphasizing Reed as
well as Fronliero. Id. at 642-53. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), in which Justice
Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, struck down a Social Security Act provision which granted
a widow survivors' benefits based on her deceased husband's earnings, while permitting a widower
benefits only if he had received at least one-half of his support from his deceased wife. Significantly,
Justice Brennan viewed this scheme as discriminatoI)' against covered wage-earning wornen who received
less protection for their spouses than enjoyed by similarly situated men. ld. at 206-07. (" . . . the
presumption of wives' dependency ... is ... based simply on 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations.
. .. ) Id. at 217.
429 U.S. 190 (1976). Nevertheless, Iustice Brennan held finn to the sex as suspect classification
theory, requiring the strictest scrutiny, regardless of whether men or women were disadvantaged by the
classifications. This analysis applied as well when the legislation was considered benign or compensatoI)'
in nature. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351. 357 (1974) (Brennan, J.).
49

so 429 U.S. at 210.
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arrests. Sl Unpersuaded by the statistical evidence, Justice Brennan concluded
that Oklahoma had failed to prove that "sex represents a legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."s2 Consequently, the Oklahoma legislative scheme failed to satisfy an "intennediate scrutiny" test requiring
that sex-based classifications "must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."s3
Justice Brennan expressed particular concern that "[t]he very social
stereotypes that find reflection in age differential laws... are likely substantially
to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics. Hence 'reckless' young
men who drink and drive are transfonned into arrest statistics, whereas their
female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.",54 Significantly, Craig,
while bending to the pragmatic need to abandon the Frontiero sex-as-suspectclassification standard, reflected Justice Brennan's conviction that sex differentiation is largely culturally created. 5s Under the intennediate or "mid-level"
scrutiny developed by Brennan in Craig v. Boren, the sex-based statutory
classification must be substantially related to achieving an important governmental
goal. S6 Brennan created the following framework for analyzing equal protection
challenges to statutes containing sex-based classifications: The classification can
withstand constitutional challenge only if it is substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective.s7 Justice Brennan would
apply this standard for classifications which discriminate against men as well as
women. In meeting its burden, the government must demonstrate that a genderneutral statute would be less effective in achieving the important governmental
goal. S8

51 Jd. at 201.
52 Jd. at 204.
53Jd. at 197. See also. Rostker v. Goldberg. 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Mississippi University For Women v.
Hogan. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (Equal protection challenge by qualified male for admission to nursing
school denied solely because of gender).

Crmg. 429 U.S. at 202 n.14. Prior to Craig. the Court had employed "... a spectrum of standards in
reviewing discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause." San Antonio Indep. School Dist v.
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1.98-99 (Marshall. J.• dissenting).

54

55 See Freedman. Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court. 92 YALE LJ. 913 (1983). Pr0fessor Freedman contrasts the approach of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart with that of Brennan and
Marshall to sex-based discrimination. In Freedman's view, Rehniquist and Stewart focus on whether in
a particular case there are "real" (biological) differences between men and women. On the other hand.
Justice Brennan views sex discrimination as more pervasive and morally problematic. See also Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Wildman. The Legitimation of Sex
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence. 63 OR. L REv. 265 (1984);
Comment, The "Substantial Relation" Question in Gender Discrimination Cases, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 149
(1985).
56 429 U.S. at 197.
51Jd.

1bis approach rejects the use and perpetuation of traditional sex roles as a legitimate governmental
purpose, creating a presumption against the validity of sex-based classifications. Justice Brennan would
then employ a means ends analysis to detennine the actual purpose of the classification and whether that
classification is substantially related to the legislative goal. In completing this analysis. Brennan would
58
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Justice Brennan applied the Craig intennediate standard of review in Orr
v.Orr.59 In Orr, the Court invalidated an Alabama law which imposed the duty
to pay alimony on men only.60 Brennan particularly objected to the Alabama
legislation's assigning a dependent role to wives within the family, since such
sex-role allocation no longer reflected the reality of women's participation in the
contemporary work force. 61
Justice Brennan was less likely than other members of the Court to accept
classifications based on the distinctive reproductive characteristics of the sexes.
Brennan's dissent in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Countl2 County
is a convincing example. Michael M. was prosecuted under California's statutory
rape law, which penalizes men for engaging in sexual intercourse with females
under eighteen.63 Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist exhibited great
deference towards the state's justification for the statutory rape law: the
prevention of teenage pregnancy. Rehnquist concluded that, since only females
can become pregnant, men and women are not similarly situated "with respect to
the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.,,64 Since the threat of pregnancy sufficiently deterred young females, the legislature could create a deterrent for
young men by imposing criminal penalties.65
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that California had presented no evidence
to prove that the threat of pregnancy deterred young females. 66 Significantly,
Brennan concluded that California's statutory rape law resulted from "outmoded
sexual stereotypes" which view males as sexual aggressors. 67
Justice Brennan consistently views "protective" or "benign" sex-based
classifications as discriminatory. In Kahn v. Shevin,68 the Court upheld a Florida
law granting widows a $500 property tax exemption.69 Although the statutory

ask whether sex is an accurate proxy for the characteristics related to the goal and whether a sex-neutral
rule could be equally effective. Freedman, supra note 55 at 926. See also Ginsburg, Sex Equality and
the Constitution, 52 TuL. L. REV. 451,468-69 (1978).
59

440 U.S. 268.279 (1979).
Id. at 283.
611d.
60

62

450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Id. at 466.
64 Id. at 471.
65 Id. at 464.
66 Id. at 492.
67 Id. at 496.
63

416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Ginsburg. Some Thoughls on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex.
10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978).

61

69

416 U.S. at 356.
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exemption had been created in 1855 on the assumption that all widows had been
fmancially dependent on their husbands, the majority accepted Florida's argument
that the law was intended to alleviate past economic discrimination against
women. 70 Justice Brennan dissented, finding no compelling governmental
interest in the Florida legislative scheme.71 Justice Brennan felt that the
difficulty with Kahn v. Shevin was that it relegated widows to a permanent,
separate status, regardless of wealth or business experience. At the same time,
it denied the state's "benevolence" to widowers who may be needy or unsophisticated.72 As such, the Florida statutory scheme perpetuates historical sex-role
stereotypes which ultimately disadvantage both men and women.73
Justice Brennan's consistent attempt to invalidate most sex-based
classifications is grounded in his view that such discrimination is a deeply-rooted,
historicru phenomenon. For example, in Frontiero Brennan confronted the "long
and unfortunate rustory of sex discrimination,,74 which remains "pervasive" in
society as "discrimination against women in our educational institutions, in the job
market. and perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.'t75 The result of
this continuing discrimination is that all sex-based laws, even those which
ostensibly benefit women, "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about
the proper place of women and their need for special protection. ,,76 The
consequence of such "protection" is that the laws are predicated on inaccurate and
inequitable assumptions about the roles played by men and women.
Justice Brennan dissented again in Schlesinger v. BaUard.71 There, the
Court faced a challenge to a Federal statute subjecting a male navy officer who
twice failed to be selected for promotion to mandatory discharge regardless of the
length of time he had been in active service.78 Under a different statute, a
female officer was subject to mandatory discharge only after thirteen years of
active service without promotion.79 In upholding the regulation, the Court found
that, because female officers were not assigned to combat duty and thus had less
opportunity for advancement than male officers, the two groups were not similarly
situated. so As a result, the classification was seen as compensatory rather than
7°Jd. at 357.

71 Jd. at 357-58 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
n/d.
73

Jd. at 360.

74411 U.S. 677,684 (1971).
1S Jd. at 686.
76Jd.
77

419 U.S. 498 (1975).

711

Jd. at 499 n.1.

79

Jd. at 499-500 and n.2

80

Jd. at 508.
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dnscriminatory.81 The majority observed that the "longer period of tenure for
women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women
officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programS.',,82 Justice
Brennan argued that because gender classification was involved, the legislation
must be examined under the strict scrutiny standard.83 He also noted that the
legislative history failed to demonstrate a compensatory purpose with regard to
female officers. 84 On the contrary, in Brennan's view "the legislative history
[was] replete with indications of a decision not to give women any special
advantage. ,,85
Significantly, in Geduldig v. Aiello,86 Brennan dissented from the Court's
application of the mere rational basis standard to the statutory exclusion of
pregnancy benefits from California's disability insurance program.81 lncredibly,
tlhe Geduldig majority insisted that the exclusion of pregnancy did not involve a
gender-based classification, but rather a distinction between pregnant cnnd
nonpregnant persons.1I1! Dnssenting, Justice Brennan argued that:
]By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked
disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard
for disability compensation. . .. Such dissimilar treatment of men
orund women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably
linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination. 89
Justice Brennan again assumed the role of passionate dissentefl O in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.91 The statute in1. question was concededly
gender--neutral on its face92 in iliat it gave preference to veterans over nooveterans in employment. The majority concluded that the statutory scheme did

81

[d.

82

[d. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Congo (1967».

83

[d. at 511 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).

04

[d. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

as [d. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86

417 U.S. 484 (1974).

07

[d. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

00

[d. at 496 n.20.

09

[d. at 501 (Brenllen, 1., dissenting).

The "intermediate tier" standard of review created by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren continues to
he employed in various factual contexts. See. e.g., City of Oebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985). However, in gender-based classification cases the Court's decisions often have placed
Brennan in the posture of dissenter.
!In

91

442 U.S. 256 (1979).

92

[d. at 274.
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not constitute invidious discrimination93 even though 98% of veterans were
male.94 On the other hand, Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in recognizing that the statute, while facially gende.-neutral, in fact, discriminated against
women by "render[ing] desirable state civil service employment an almost
exclusively male prerogative. 1195
In Robens v. United States Jaycees,96 Justice Brennan enjoyed a now-rare
position writing for the Court rather than in dissent 91 Brennan faced a conflict
between First Amendment individual liberties and anti-discrimination state laws.
At issue was the membership scheme of the national Jaycees which limited
regular membership to men. 98 Two Minnesota chapters began accepting women
as regular members, arguing that the Minnesota Human Rights Act mandated this
action. The national organization alleged its First Amendment rights of speech
and association had been abridged. 99 Although Justice Brennan conceded that
application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act would cause "incidental abridgment" lOO of protected speech, such de minimis restriction was necessary to
achieve the state's legitimate purpose in attacking invidious gender discrimination. lOl

Privacy and Personal Autonomy

Justice Brennan's views on privacy and personal autonomy were grounded
in his belief that the Constitution is subject to "contemporary ratification." I02
By this, Brennan meant that the Court must promote human dignity and personal
autonomy as measured by changing societal needs and values, rather than by the

93

I d. at 280-81.

94

/d. at 270-71.

Id. at 283. (Marshall, J. o dissenting). See also, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). holding that
the Selective Service Act, which required registration of males only did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 83. Justice Brennan again dissented.
96 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
97 Id. at 612.
98 Id.
95

99

Id. at 614.

100 Id. at 628. Women have sought to gain membership in men's clubs where significant professional and
business contacts often occur. See generally, Burns, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's
Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HAR C.R.-C.L.L.REV. 321 (1983).
Professor Rhode suggests a different viewpoint than Justice Brennan's. "An alternative theoretical
framework for evaluating separatist associations should neither minimize the values at issue nor assume
their primacy for all selective organizations. Such an approach requires a greater sensitivity to context,
to the varying cultural functions, meanings. and consequences of particular social relationships. Rhode.
Association and Assimilation. 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106. 124 (1986).
101 468 U.S. at 629.

102 Speech by Justice Brennan at Georgetown University. The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification (Oct 12. 1985). REPRINTED IN A. Mason and D. Stephenson. American
Constitutional Law (1987).
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Framers' original intent In fact, Brennan viewed the Framers' intent as
essentially indiscernible, fmding it "arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we
can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to
specific, contemporary questions."IOJ
Justice Brennan's dissenting opInIOn in Michael H. v. Gerald D.l04
evinces his view on individual privacy and autonomy. Michael H. sought to
maintain a relationship with his biological daughter although the child's mother
was married to another man. lOS The controlling California statute established
a conclusive presumption in favor of the paternity of the mother's husband. lOO
Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that the "liberty" protected by
substantive due process extended only to the liberty to engage in activities which
have been protected "traditionally" from societal or state contro1. 107 Since
Michael H.'s parental interest as an "adulterous biological father" had not been
protected by societal or constitutional tradition, Scalia found the California
conclusive presumption constitutionally valid. lOS
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found Scalia's interpretation so narrow as to
destroy the doctrine of substantive due process. 109 Admittedly, the legal
"tradition" of the nation contains statutes criminalizing both abortion and the
distribution of contraceptive devices. As a result, Brennan found Scalia's
approach to be so limiting as to provide no real limit. llo Brennan argued that
societal tradition is not the necessary condition to defIDing liberty which is
protected from state action. Although recognizing the relevance of tradition,
Brennan argued that the tradition which delineates the parameters of "liberty" is
general, not specific. lll Therefore, the liberties protected by due process are
embodied in the general tradition precedentially protected by the Supreme Court,

103

Id.

lOt

109 S. Ct 2333 (1989).
Id. at 2335.
Id.

105
1015
107

lOS

Id. at 2346.
Id. at 2344.

109 Id. at 2350-51 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). Scalia's test would invalidate the following Supreme Court
decisions: Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept't of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841 (1990) (upholding right to die); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (upholding right of unmarried individuals to use contraceptive devices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (upholding right of married individuals to use contraceptive devices). See also, Tribe,
"Commentary-The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the
Dilemma o/Dependence," 99 HARV. LREV. 330 (1985) (arguing denial of abortion rights helps perpetuate
hierarchical relationships in which women are subjugated).
110

III

Michael H., at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2350.
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including parenthood, contraception and reproduction. 1l2 Indeed, under Justice
Brennan's view, the tradition protecting Michael H. 's liberty interest exists in the
Supreme Court decisions which affirmed the right of unwed fathers to parent their
children. 113 In effect, the California conclusive presumption violated this
Supreme Court tradition. 1l4
Justice Brennan's view concerning the personal right to choose abortion
confmns his determination to protect individual autonomy and privacy as basic
civil rights. In Harris v. McRae,IlS Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's
holding that the Hyde Amendment's denial of public funding for certain
medically necessary abortions subject to medicaid funding does not contravene
the equal protection or liberty guarantees of the Due Process Clausesy6
Brennan's dissent underscored his views that Roe v. Wade and its progeny
guarantee the constitutional right to personal privacy, protecting women from
governmental interference during the first trimester. ll7 Specifically, Brennan
concluded that "the state must refrain from wielding its enormous power and
influence in a manner that burden the pregnant woman's freedom to choose
whether to have an abortion. 118
Significantly, Justice Brennan is one of the first members of the Court to
treat gender-related characteristics, such as pregnancy, in non-discriminatory
terms. Justice Brennan's approach contributed in the most significant manner to
the debate concerning the definition and desirability of equality between women
and men. Justice Brennan rejected the concept that most sex-based differences
are "real" and biologically detennined. 1l9 Since American society is largely

112

[d.

113

Id. at 2351-55. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed. 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v.illinois, 405 U.S. 645

(1972).
Michael H., at 2355.

114

m 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116

[d. at 329.

117

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

118

448 U.S. at 329. See also, Justice Brennan's dissent in Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo.,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 499 (1983), arguing that the statutory second physician requirement is
overbroad where maternal health considerations required the use of procedures, such as dilation and
evacuation, which leave no possibility of fetal survival.
119 See e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,463 (1981) (Rehnquist, I., joining Stewart, J., concuning
in the result); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in pertinent
part). The "real" sex differences approach stresses gender distinctions which are "real" in the sense of
being "natural" or "biological", such as pregnancy, menstruation orlaclation. The significant question to
the "real" differences proponents is whether women and men are different in fact with respect to a specific
legislative classification. See also, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(pregnancy as a "natural" deterrent to sexual intercourse for young women, but not young men).
Classifications based on such "real" differences are often over-inclusive in that many members of each
gender lack the reproductive characteristics defining their sex. For example, excluding all women from
a particular workplace because of dangers to reproduction would be over-inclusive to the extent that some
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characterized by sex differentiation, gender segregation, and gender-based
hierarchical structures in the home, in the workplace and in the legislature, even
facially neutral laws are likely to have a disparate impact on either men or
women. 120 For example, seemingly neutral rules such as seniority and tenure,
in fact discriminate against women because mothers, rather than fathers, are likely
to intenupt their working lives to parent. 121
Privacy, "Real" Gender Differences and Pregnancy

Although explicit gender classifications involving pregnancy have been
deemed constitutionally valid because only women can become pregnant,122 the
Court has exhibited substantial difficulty in dealing with pregnancy legislation.
The fact that pregnancy is gender specific has raised doctrinal problems and
inconsistencies in the decisional law. Indeed, the Court has exhibited considerable reluctance to treat pregnancy classifications as sex-based discrimination.
Significantly, the Court has had considerable difficulty in even perceiving
disparate treatment issues in pregnancy classifications.
In Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur,123 the Court considered two

mandatory maternity leave policies which excluded pregnant teachers from the
classroom even though the teachers were willing and able to teach.l24 The
circuit courts of appeals had treated the problem as one of equal protection. 125
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose to strike down the policies on due process
grounds: the policies constituted impennissible irrebuttable presumptions about
the pregnant woman's capacity to work, unduly burdening her fundamental right
to bear a child. 126
As previously discussed, the Court did apply equal protection analysis to

women are infertile.
120 See, e.g., Goode, Why Men Resist in RetlUnking the Family 131 (B. Thome ~ M. Yalour eds. 1982);
Note, Toward a Redefinition 0/ Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487 (1981).

121 See, e.g., Beck, The Gender Factory (1985); Liefland, Career Patterns 0/ Male and Female lAwyers.
35 BUFF. L. REv. 601 (1986) (women lawyers act as primary childcare providers within the family);
Weiler. The Wages o/Sex: The Uses and Limits o/Comparable Worth. 99 HARv. L. REv. 1728, 1785-87
(1986).
122

See Miclulel M .• 450 U.S. 464 (1981).

In 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun. Justices Douglas and Powell concurred, while Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rcbnquist dissented.
I~ [d. at 645.
125 LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Education. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (classification based on sex).
cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd.• 474 F.2d 395,397 (4th Cir. 1973) (no sex discrimination
present because pregnancy rules do "not apply to women in an area in which they compete with men. H).
1211 414 U.S. at 644-48.

330

AKRON

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2

pregnancy in Geduldig v. Aiello. 121 The California disability insurance scheme
covered numerous conditions, some expensive or voluntary, which applied to both
sexes. The scheme also covered some health conditions unique to men, such as
circumcision and prostatitis, while excluding nonnal pregnancy and childbi rth. 128 The majority applied the minimum rationality standard, holding that
the equal protection clause did not mandate the "sacrifice" of California's
disability system. 129
Justice Brennan dissented. 130 Unlike the majority, Brennan recognized
that pregnancy-related disabilities are truly gender-linked disabilities since they
result from physical characteristics inextricably possessed by women. 131 Justice
Brennan accurately concluded that treating pregnancy disabilities differently than
male sex-linked disabilities such as prostatitis constituted sex discrimination. 132
The Court continued its incredible and unworkable approach to pregnancy
in the Title VII case, General Electric v. Gilben.133 Despite the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's promulgation of guidelines construing Title VII
of the Civil Rights Ad 34 to mandate pregnancy coverage,13S the Court denied
relief to women whose company disability policy extended benefits for
nonoccupational health problems, while excluding pregnancy.136 Again, the
majority distinguished between pregnant and unpregnant persons, stressing the
fact that pregnancy is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.,,131

IZ7 See supra note 86 and accompanying text The GeduJdig majority dismissed the gender discrimination
issue in a footnote, 417 U.S. at 496-97. (,1ack of identity between the excluded disability
and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but
merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. . .. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes").
128 Gedu/dig at 501.
129 [d. at 494.

130

[d. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

131

[d. at 501.

132

[d. at 501.

133

429 U.S. 125 (1976).

134

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

The' Court found the statute's "plain meaning" did not mandate pregnancy coverage. 429 U.S. 125,
145; cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860-65 (1984).
136 [d. at 145.

135

m [d. However, vasectomy, which is also "voluntary" was covered by the General Electric plan. See
Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1532, 1561-63 (1974).
Eventually, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") of 1978, amending Title VII to
include pregnancy classifications within the definition of sex discrimination. See also, Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) ("discrimination based on a
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex").

Fall, 1991]

GENDER JURISPRUDFNCE

331

Naturally, Justice Brennan dissented.138 Brennan rejected the majority's
insistence that pregnancy is a "gender-free" classification. 139 Significantly,
Brennan argued that the majority's analysis "proves to be simplistic and
misleading" .140 Emphasizing the fact that all other sex-specific disabilities were
covered by the plan, Justice Brennan concluded that excluding pregnancy
disadvantaged women in the workplace. 141 The General Electric plan, therefore,
discriminated against women by encouraging outmoded stereotypes of women in
the workplace. 142
As such, Justice Brennan recognized that historical and societal attitudes
towards women and pregnancy, rather than "real" gender differences created legal
disabilities for women. 143 Brennan's analysis promotes gender equality by
recognizing that the injury of sex discrimination rests in being deprived of
political, legal, or educational opportunity merely because one is a woman or a
man. l44 The genius of Justice Brennan's gender jurisprudence as it related to
pregnancy is that he demanded the law abandon negative stereotypes in favor of
equal treatment for women and men.
"Benign" Gender Discrimination

Justice Brennan generally opposed sex-based classifications which had the
"benign" purpose of "compensat[ing] female beneficiaries as a group for the
economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves
and their families. ,,145 As previously discussed, Justice Brennan routinely

138

Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146.

1391d. at 147.
140

Id. at 152.

141 Id at 155.
142 Id. at 159-60.
1431d.
144 Feminist writers disagree fundamentally on the question of whether pregnancy requires "special"
treatment Minimi:ling the legal consequences of physical differences between women and men has been
an accepted methodology under equal protection analysis. This "equal treatment" or "assimilationist"
model treats man as the standard by which equality is defined. However, this approach may prove
unworkable as applied to pregnancy classifications. See generally, Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. Iu.
L. REV. 39 (1985); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L REV. 955 (1984). Treating
women and men as similarly situated on issues of pregnancy and reproduction may, in fact, violate equal
protection considerations in that women and men are not the same for reproductive purpose. Simply
stated, "pregnancy ... and creation of another human being are special -- very special. Women have these
experiences. Men do not" Law, supra at 1007. See also Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and
Equal TreatmenllSpecial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y. U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984); MacKinnon,
Introduction to Symposium on Sexual Harassment, 10 CAP. U. L REv. I. VI. n.21 (1981).
145 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1978) (rejecting this "benign" purpose as illegal
discrimination). cf Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct 1442 (1987), where Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, upheld a voluntarily-adopted affirmative action plan under Title VII which
permitted gender to be considered as one factor in jobs, such as dispatcher, in which women are underrepresented significantly. Professor Sullivan argues that voluntary affirmative action programs should not

332

AKRON

LAw REVIEW

(Vol. 25:2

rejected remedial measures grounded in the "romantic patemalism"l46 which
actually perpetuates traditional sex roles. Brennan feared that even those genderbased classifications which government considered "an affinnative step toward
alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination against women,,147
ultimately promoted the very gender stereotypes which foster gender inequality.148
As previously discussed, Kahn v. Shevin,149 is an example of "benign" or
remedial legislation endorsed by the Court, but condemned by Justice Brennan. lSO In Kahn, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, upheld an 1885
Florida statute granting all widows a limited property tax exemption. lSI
Although the 1855 enactment date belies the legislative intent of "alleviating the
effects of past economic discrimination against women", Justice Douglas
explicitly adopted Florida's rationale. Justice Douglas reasoned that "[w]hether
from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated
culture, the job marlc.et is inhospitable to the women seeking any but the lowest
paid jobs. ,,152 Citing data demonstrating that the median income of working
women was less than sixty percent of the male median, Justice Douglas concluded
that:
The disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the
widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his
spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which,
because of her fOImer economic dependency, she will have fewer
skills to offer. lS3

require the same depee of judicial suspicion as court - ordered remedies. Sullivan. The Supreme Court,

1986 Term -- Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's AjJirmillive Action Cases. 100 HARV. L.
REv. 78. 96-97 (1986). cf. Days. Fullilove. 96 YALB L.l. 451. 483-84 (1987). arguing that voluntary
affinnative action programs must be justified by more extensive demonstrations of past discrimination
because "more than good motives should be required when government seeks to allocate its resources by
way of an explicit racial classification system. It must be shown that such a system is responsive to
findings of racial discrimination. is designed to redress that problem. and is employed only as long as is
necessary to achieve its remedial objective." Id.
146

Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313. 320 (1977) (per curiam).

147

Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974) (Brennan. 1.• dissenting).

141 See also Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495. 520-21 (1976): "Habit,
rather than analysis. makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female .... But
that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no rational relationship - other than pure prejudicial
discrimination - to the stated pwpose for which the classification is being made." 1d.
149 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
130

[d. at 358.

151

1d. at 355.

152

[d. at 353.

153

[d. at 354.
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Although Justice Douglas' sensitivity to the peIVasiveness of economic
discrimination against women is commendable, it fails to justify the establishment
of a permanent, separate legal classification for all widows, regardless of their
actual wealth, business experience, or gender victimization Indeed, the legislative
classification in Kahn promotes the outmoded stereotypes of women which create
and perpetuate worlcplace inequality. Essentially, Justice Douglas undermines his
own sensitivity to gender discrimination by justifying the continued use of
discriminatory sex-based classifications to remedy past inequities.
Justice Brennan understood this paradox. He insisted that legislative
classifications (such as the one in Kahn) adversely affecting men should be
subjected to the same scrutiny as sex-based laws discriminating against women.
Significantly, Justice Brennan opposed most sex-based classifications as endorsing
sex discrimination which is both constitutionally and morally problematic.
Although Justice Brennan acknowledged the nation's "long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination,lS4 his gender jurisprudence explicitly rejected
"benign" laws which burdened men in the name of remedying discrimination
against women. Implicitly, Justice Brennan recognized that such "benign"
legislative schemes actually embrace the outmoded stereotypes which relegate
women to a different, unequal sphere. Ultimately, such remedial or benign
classifications place women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.
As a result, Brennan's gender jurisprudence contributes significantly to the
essential debate concerning the meaning of gender eqUality. Rejecting the
unreflective biologic determinism permeating most sex-based classifications,
Brennan sought to replace them with gender-neutral alternatives. Accordingly,
Justice Brennan drafted the plurality opinion in Califano v. Gold/arb. iSS There,
the Court invalidated a Social Security provision providing sUIVivor benefits to
widowers only on a showing of substantial reliance on the deceased wife's
income, while paying benefits to all widows, regardless of economic dependence. 1S6 The dissenters, led by Justice Rehnquist, were troubled by the fact
that male litigants were able to invalidate legislation on the basis of sex-based
discrimination without demonstrating that men are historically, economically, or
politically disadvantaged. 1S7 Indeed, most of the benign discrimination cases
brought to date have been instituted by males seeking "advantaged" treatment as

154

411

U.s. 677,687.

u, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
136

Id. at 217.

157 Craig, 429 U.S. at 218-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist has argued consistently that
men are not historical victims of economic or political discrimination. Therefore, men, unlike women,
are not "in need of the special solicitude of the courts." Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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women. ISS These men did not want preferential treatment to be terminated-rather, they wanted the preferential treatment extended to themselves. In this
respect there is no analog between "benign" or remedial racial legislation and
remedial gender legislation. In racial discrimination legislation, the minority
group seeks only one goal: attainment of the status accorded for white males.
On the other hand, gender discrimination litigation follows two themes: 159
women seek to be treated like men in the workplace l60 and men seek to be
treated like women in the area of personal or family life. 161

CONCLUSION

It is virtually impossible to overestimate Justice Brennan's impact on the

Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence. Although Brennan was unable to forge
a majority to treat sex as a suspect classification, his attempts to create such an
analytical framework helped the Coun emerge from decades of paternalism and
discrimination.
Justice Brennan once stated:
[T]he ultimate question must be, what do the works of the text
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs. 162
Justice Brennan deserves great credit for crafting a unique, far-reaching
gender jurisprudence. His greatness is not only that he was creative and
courageous, but that he urged both the Court and society to be creative and
courageous, as well. To all familiar with his gender jurisprudence, Justice
Brennan shall be remembered as one of the most innovative protectors of equal
treatment before the law.

lSi See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (male seeking "mother's benefits" as surviving
parent); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (male seeking overturn of State law permitting alimony awards
only to women); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (male seeking worker
compensation benefits provided only to widows).

Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 UNlv. ILL. L REV. 39, 45-47,75-77 (1985).
See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Turner v. Department of Employment
Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
161 See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
162 See Brennan, supra, note 102, at 610.
159
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